AJM - Abstracts

Corporate Financial Statements, A Product of the Market and Political Processes

Ross L. Watts

Abstract

An outline for a theory of financial statements is presented. Financial statements are viewed as products of both markets and political processes and the interactions among individuals and groups in these processes. Individuals are assumed to maximise their self-interests. Various hypotheses and data are provided to illustrate the theory. It relies heavily on theory of agency, economic regulation and public choice. At this stage, the theory has great promise in explaining the form and contents of financial statements. The theory contrasts with earlier <91>normative<92> theories of financial statements and offers and explanation for the forms they take.

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Keywords

ACCOUNTING PROCEDURES; ACCOUNTING THEORY; AGENCY; ECONOMIC REGULATION; FINANCIAL STATEMENTS; PUBLIC CHOICE

Contact Details

Ross L. Watss
Graduate School of Management,
University of Rochester,
Rochester, NEW YORK, USA.

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Congress of the New South Wales Branch of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia in June, 1970. Many of the ideas in that earlier paper evolved from discussions I had with M. Jensen while we were trying to write a paper on accounting theory. The concepts in this paper are substantially more developed than in the original paper. Some of those developments were conceived during attempts by J. Zimmerman and myself to test hypotheses generated by the 1974 paper. A major development, the structure of the Agency Problem, was provided by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Thus I owe a great deal to Jensen, Meckling and Zimmerman. However, they are not responsible for any errors in the paper. I am also indebted to G. Benston, B. Hoithausen, M. Krasney, B. Leftwich and C. Smith for their helpful comments and suggestions.