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Volume 29 Number 2 December 2004
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Are auctions more efficient than fixed price schemes when bidders learn? |
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Atakelty Hailu Steven Schilizzi
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Abstract |
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Auctions are increasingly being considered as a mechanism for allocating
conservation contracts to private landowners. This interest is based on the widely
held belief that competitive bidding helps minimize information rents. This study
constructs an agent-based model to evaluate the long term performance of
conservation auctions under settings where bidders are allowed to learn from
previous outcomes. The results clearly indicate that the efficiency benefits of one-shot
auctions are quickly eroded under dynamic settings. Furthermore, the auction
mechanism is not found to be superior to fixed payment schemes except when the
latter involve the use of high prices
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Download this article.
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Keywords |
| AUCTIONS; GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT; EFFICENCY OF PUBLIC SPENDING; BIODIVERSITY CONVERSATION; LEARNING; AGENT-BASED MODELLING |
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Contact Details
Atakelty Hailu
Steven Schilizzi
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