10. Contracting, or The Rules of the Game
(See McMillan, Chapters 8, 9)

10.1 Strategising versus Economising

10.1.1 Contracts Integrate
Game theory and standard microeconomics: how contracts integrate the two.
- A contract: an agreement that supports exchange between supplier (seller) and buyer (demander).
- Standard microeconomics: Supply = Demand is just the Nash equilibrium of a game where no-one’s decisions affect the welfare of anyone else. (Perfect competition, and all are price-takers.)
- Costless contracts: Even with small numbers, can achieve the perfect competition outcome (e.g. taxi prices in Sydney: fare, route, speed, time.)

10.1.2 Prediction and Design
How Game Theory helps in a real world of costly contracts — twice.
1. Predicts what will happen under different contractual arrangements.
2. Allows us to choose (or to design) the best one, (Choosing the Game). e.g.:
   — Make or Buy? (production integration)
   — Debt or Equity? (capital structure)
   — Privatised or Publicly Owned? (ownership)
   — Division or Spin Off? (organisational structure)
10.1.3 Strategising versus economising

(See Williamson’s paper in the Package)

Game Theory usually applied to issues of “strategising”, i.e., beating rivals or consumers
• Pre-emptive threats/entry deterrence.
• Cartel enforcement.
• Bargaining and bidding.

Economising — the positive-sum, efficiency-enhancing aspects — often neglected in game theory (and in corporate strategy).

Why neglected?

There are two illusions:
• Illusion from micro theory that it’s easy to minimise costs: set Wage = Value of the Marginal Product of Labour.
  But this is very difficult and costly to monitor on the shop floor.
• Illusion that powerful tools from game theory don’t help to economise, in Finance or in Human Resource Management.

But game theory can be very useful, especially for economising.

10.2 Using Game Theory to Enhance Efficiency

10.2.1 General Principles

1. Game theory is often taught through simple examples, chosen on an ad-hoc basis.
   e.g. battles, interactions, kids and credibility.

2. Contracting perspective, by contrast:
   • choose the game, contract
   • solve for the equilibrium of the game, contract
   • then ask:
     — are the players pleased with the outcome?
     — what can they do to achieve a better outcome? How?

3. Basic idea: when you negotiate a contract with someone, you are proposing to play a game, structured by the contract.

   Since you must get them to play, and they solve for the equilibrium as you do, it pays you to choose the game (the contract) with the most efficient outcome, to maximise the size of the pie, given a claim over fixed slice.

   e.g. employee — pay, conditions, work, supervisor’s interests, etc; auction
10.3 Creating Incentives

- How can you make it in another person's interest to behave as you want? Especially with a divergence of interests, aims.
- How can you create incentives?
- Rewards & punishments — carrots & sticks.
- The pervasive Principal-Agent problems:
  - author v. publisher
  - debt v. equity
  - landlord v. tenant
  - subcontractor v. price contractor
  - employer v. employee
  - insured v. insurer
- HRM: change agent’s goals ⇒ principal’s goals
- Here: focus on the use of monetary rewards — important (although not necessary) and simple to understand.

10.3.1 Piece Rates, Commissions, & Royalties

Performance incentives ubiquitous —
- piece rates/bonuses/commissions for production workers
- pay for performance (bonuses, share options)
- sales reps. paid by commission
- professional sports?
- academic supplements
- forecasters’ accuracy (?)

Cost minimisation instead of maximum output:
- cost-minimisation is costly
- contracts vary from one extreme to another — who bears the risk?
  - fixed-price contracts?
  - cost-plus contracts?
  - incentive contracts?

A verbal contract isn’t worth the paper it’s written on.

— Samuel Goldwyn
10.3.2 Marginal Incentives

If principal can cheaply, perfectly monitor agent’s “effort”:
   then no problem:
      simply link payments to effort
But usually impossible or costly to monitor agent’s effort, so
   — link pay to performance, not effort
   — link pay to output, not input
   — OK if constant, predictable relationship: effort → performance
   — but random events, uncertainties intervene
   — agent may “slack” or “shirk”
So:
1. Divergence of interests.
2. Imperfectly observable “efforts” of agent.
   — not necessarily how hard the agent works
   — but to what end?
Incentive effort — at the margin,
   where costs of extra effort = gain from extra effort
The higher the commission rate, the more the selling effort.

10.3.3 Carrots & Sticks

Look at from the worker’s point of view:
• if she performs better, do her pay or rewards increase?
• if she performs worse, does her pay fall or her punishment increase?
That is:
• Piece rates or commission — continuum:
   \[
   \frac{\Delta \text{ reward}}{\Delta \text{ performance}} > 0
   \]
   where performance id measurable.
• But incentive schemes are often discontinuous:
   \[
   \frac{\Delta \text{ reward}}{\Delta \text{ performance}} = 0 \text{ or } \frac{\Delta \text{ punishment}}{\Delta \text{ performance}} = 0
   \]
   — threat of firing
   — fines
   — legal liabilities
   — prizes, promotions, bonuses
• Discontinuous incentive schemes can substitute for continuous:
   — wage ($/hr) + punishment after monitoring (firing)
   — wage ($/hr) + reward after monitoring (promotion)
10.3.4 Multi-Dimensional Performance

A danger:
- not that incentive schemes fail, but
- but that they work too well

Agents concentrate on the goal with explicit incentives.

One tradeoff:
- quantity v. quality
  e.g. jet engine blades
  e.g. production-line workers,
  “shirking” = higher defect rates
- when quality is hard to monitor
  e.g. pay all but the quality-control workers by the piece
  it is difficult to control the quality of quality control
- even with time payment, can use discontinuous rewards/punishments to mimic continuous incentive schemes.

E.g. Sears ended its commission to its mechanics, to enhance its credibility with its customers, who might have suspected over-servicing as a result of the mechanics’ incentives.

10.3.5 The Principal’s Ideal Payment Scheme

“The shortest and best way to make your fortune is to let people see clearly that it is in their interests to promote yours.”

- How?
  - Set the agent’s marginal payment scheme $\lambda$ (commission, royalty, piece rate, etc.) at 100%.
  - E.g. the salesperson example:
    - ideal amount of agent’s effort, from the principal’s viewpoint?
    - assume the agent’s costs equal the principal’s
    - assume diminishing return to effort
    - the principal: gets 100% of the benefits and incurs 100% of the costs so exerts effort to the point where marginal costs equal marginal returns or effort: marginal cost (effort) = marginal returns ($P = MC$)
    - the agent bears the full cost of any marginal effort, whatever the $\lambda$
    - at $\lambda = 30\%$, the agent would exert effort up to the point where the cost of $100$ extra sales is $30$, less than the principal’s effort (of $100$).
    - with $\lambda = 100\%$, the agent reaps the full benefits, and exerts effort up to the point where the cost of $100$ extra sales is $100$, as does the principal.
— thus $\lambda = 100\% \Rightarrow$ agent’s interests and principal’s identical, and the gain from trade to be divided between principal and agent is maximised.

• How does the principal earn anything from the deal?
— as well as the commission rate $\lambda$, the deal includes a fixed payment $f$
— the principal uses the rate $\lambda$ to induce appropriate actions by the agent at the margin, and the fixed fee $f$ to get some of the gains to trade herself (Limited by agent’s alternatives, given his veto.)
— the fixed fee $f$ is a payment from agent to principal
— in effect the principal sells the agent the right to be the agent: self-employed, arm’s-length relationship

e.g. Lord Cornwallis in Bengal, in the late eighteenth century.

10.4 Designing Contracts

Ideal contracts (100% marginal payment schemes) seldom seen.

Two flaws: Contracts do more than generate incentives for effort:

1. if the principal can’t know how productive the agent is, then she may want to offer a “menu” of contracts to induce the agent to reveal his productivity — private information;

2. the agent’s performance is a function of outside events, but the agent bears all of the risk — if the agent is risk averse, it may not be in the principal’s interest to force the agent to bear the risk.
10.4.1 Contracting with Private Information

e.g. The sales manager (the principal) knows only that the value of a particular area is either high or low, but only the salesperson (the agent) knows which.

Possible for the manager to offer the agent a different package (commission rate $\lambda$ and salary $F$) depending on whether the agent reports his sales potential as high or low, subject to the agent’s fallback position.

Possible (with appropriate packages — see McMillan Ch. 9) to induce the agent to give an honest report:

- Total package payments must be higher when the potential is correctly reported as high than when correctly reported as low.
- Commission rate must be higher, and the base salary lower, for a report of high potential than for a report of low potential.

How well does the principal do?

The commission rate must do double duty:

- elicit information, and
- elicit effort (as above)

\[ \therefore \text{it must be less than 100\%}, \]

\[ \therefore \text{the agent's private information costs the principal}. \]

Useful to use salespeople’s information in contracts and in corporate planning.

Why did U.S. piece-rate workers earn 14\% more than workers on fixed wages?

- self-selection: more skillful workers choose companies with piece-rate payments, while others prefer fixed salaries;
- people work harder when rewarded for the results of their extra effort;
- since piece-rate workers’ pay is not only higher but more volatile than fixed-wage workers’ pay, to some extent the higher earnings are compensation for higher risk borne by the piece-rate workers.
10.4.2 Risk-Sharing versus Incentives

Performance-based contracts subject the agents to risk, to some extent outside their control.

Most people are risk-averse: they would insure against risk by forgoing some of their anticipated earnings if that would reduce the earnings’ variability.

The agent is often more risk averse than the principal: a firm is better able to bear risks than its individual employees are.

∴ We might expect a smaller average payment to the agent in return for principal absorbing some of the risk.

But this will weaken the agent’s incentives:

Any contract will be a compromise between risk-bearing and incentives. What is the principal’s best tradeoff?

Two questions:

• How much discretionary scope does the agent have to produce variations in performance?
• How much money would the agent be prepared to forgo to have the risk associated with the task removed from his shoulders?

The commission rate should depend on the relative size of these two numbers.

So long as the principal is less risk-averse than the agent, sharing risk is a win-win proposition.

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10.4.3 Risk-Sharing via Contracts

A fixed-price contract will give the agent — the firm contracting with the government (the principal) — the incentive to choose the effort level that maximises the total return from the transaction, but at risk.

A cost-plus contract puts the risk on the principal, but has the disadvantage of giving the agent no incentive to limit production costs.

An incentive contract is an intermediate form: allows the agent to pass on some fraction of cost increases as price increases.
10.4.4 Relative Performance Evaluation

With perfect information to infer the agent’s actions, the principal could design a contract to elicit the desired actions.

The principal can obtain more information than just the agent’s output: the outputs of others.

This can be obtained through benchmarking with other firms, or though tournaments among agents, with prizes and rewards.

(See McMillan Ch. 10 on Setting Executives’ Incentives.)