

Pricing to Mass Markets



Simple Monopoly Pricing,
Price Discrimination and
the Losses from Monopoly

Many Buyers



- Costly to set individual prices to each consumer to extract their individual willingness-to-pay.
 - If set different prices, some consumers might re-sell to others. Your buyers might be potential competitors.
 - Using a discounting strategy may cause some consumers to wait for
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Information Problems



- Sellers do not know buyers' willingnesses-to-pay
 - Buyers do not know sellers' costs
 - May have a good statistical idea of distribution of types in the population.
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Some Questions



- *Why do unions sometimes strike?*
 - Why do unions ever strike in practice?
 - When would you expect that strikes are most likely?
 - *Why do disputes ever go to court?*
 - Why do disputes ever reach the courtroom in practice?
 - When would you expect that court trials are most likely?
 - Are most disputes settled out of court?
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Car Selling

- Seller has many cars for sale. Each is worth \$1,000
- There are two kinds of buyers

Type	Value	Proportion of Population
High	\$1,100	?
Low	\$1,040	?

One-sided Private Information



- Seller does not know each individual buyer's type but knows the proportion of each type
 - Buyer's know their own type
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Bargaining



- Seller makes take-it-or-leave-it offer to any potential buyer
 - Must offer the same price to all:
 - Charge \$1,040 and get expected profit of \$40
 - Charge \$1,100 and get expected profit of \$50
 - These are the only two price candidates
 - Seller takes a 50% chance of not realising gains from trade
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No Breakdown



Type	Value	Proportion of Population
High	\$1,100	?
Low	\$1,060	?

Bargaining Experiment



- Pair-off
 - Decide who is the seller and buyer
 - If seller's last name is from A-M, they value the good at \$1. Otherwise, they value it at \$5
 - The buyer values the good by \$2 more than the seller's value.
 - You have 5 minutes, tell me as soon as you have an agreement
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Experiment #2



- Switch pairs and choose roles
 - If seller's birthday is an odd numbered year (say 1967), their value is \$1. Otherwise it is \$5. DO NOT REVEAL THIS TO THE BUYER (YET)
 - The buyer values the good \$2 more than the seller
 - Same deal on reporting.
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Screening



- When it does not have information, the seller may miss out on valuable trades
 - What actions can the uninformed seller take to improve this?
 - Can the seller use *screening*? That is, structure negotiations to reveal information.
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Example again ...



- Suppose agreement may be reached immediately or one week later
 - Buyer dislikes waiting and will evaluate costs and benefits at 80% of this week's value.
 - Seller has no delay costs.
 - The seller can commit to a price schedule: a price for this week and a price for next week.
 - Buyer valuations as in second case (low = \$1,060).
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Price Schedule



- What price schedule does the seller choose?
 - Choose prices to get sorting
 - Have high value buyer not delay
 - Have low value buyers delay
 - If second week price is \$1,060: what should immediate price (p) be?
 - Make high value buyer indifferent between taking that price and waiting
 - $\$1,100 - p > 0.8 (\$1,100 - \$1,060) = \32
 - So long as p is less than \$1,068, will get screening.
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Profits from Screening



- Now get \$1,060 from low value buyers and \$1,068 from high value buyers.
 - Thus, on average price will be \$1,064.
 - Before screening, average price was \$1,060.
 - But does such haggling always work? What if the low buyer's valuation is \$1,040?
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Age-Wage Profiles



- Pay increases with age -- this occurs even when controlling for higher human capital, responsibility and experience. Why?
 - Could be a screening device. Turnover is costly to firms. Want to identify people who are less likely to move jobs.
 - A positive age-pay profile, attracts workers who intend to stay with the firm and, thus, accept low wages initially.
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Looking forward ...



- Concept of mass market demand
 - Relationship between revenue and demand
 - Concept of elasticity
 - Profit maximising price levels
 - Durable goods monopoly
 - Price discrimination
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Posted prices versus negotiation



- In mass markets, it is more convenient to simply post a price.
 - Consumers whose willingness-to-pay is above that price will purchase from you.
 - Consumers will lower their own demand and just purchase units for which their WTP for that unit exceeds price.
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Mass Market Demand




- The monopolist faces a demand schedule or curve.
 - This describes the number of units the monopolist will sell for any given price.
 - The market demand curve is found by summing up the willingness-to-pay curves of all potential consumers.
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Numerical Example



- Monopoly seller with marginal cost of \$200 per unit. Can supply entire market.
 - 1,000 potential buyers (only interested in a single unit each). Have different WTP ranging from \$0 to \$1,000.
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Market Demand Curve



Value Created



- What is the maximum value created in this market?
 - Simple rule: a unit should be sold if the WTP on that unit exceeds MC
 - Therefore, produce 800 units at \$200 each.
 - This yields total value of $(1000 - 200) * 800 / 2$ or \$320,000.
 - This is the maximum *consumer surplus*.
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How does price influence revenue?



- As monopolist raises price:
 - they reduce the number of units sold (buyers are excluded)
 - the increase the mark-up on each unit they do sell.
 - This is the price setter's dilemma. By raising price the monopolist can capture more value but at the cost of excluding buyers.
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Price and Revenue



Price	\$1000	\$900	\$800	\$700	\$600	\$500	\$400	\$300	\$200
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
Revenue	\$0	\$90t	\$160t	\$210t	\$240t	\$250t	\$240t	\$210t	\$160t
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Revenue and Elasticity




- Notice that as price rises, revenue increases initially and then falls.
 - In determining price it is important to know how sensitive demand is to price changes.
 - If it is relatively insensitive, then by raising price the monopolist does not exclude many buyers.
 - If it is relatively sensitive, raising price can exclude many buyers.
 - Sensitivity is related to the mathematical
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Perfectly Elastic Demand



Perfectly Inelastic Demand



Algebraic Analysis

- In mathematical terms, sensitivity of a demand or supply function is captured by the term elasticity.

- For example, price elasticity of demand is the percentage change in quantity demanded divided by the percentage

$$E_D = \frac{\% \text{ change in } Q_D}{\% \text{ change in } P} = \frac{\Delta Q_D / Q_D}{\Delta P / P}$$

Some Terminology



Term	Value of Price Elasticity of Demand (E_D)
Perfectly inelastic	0 (vertical demand)
Inelastic	Less than 1
Unit elastic	1
Elastic	Greater than 1
Perfectly elastic	Infinity (horizontal)
<u>Good A is relatively elastic compared with good B</u>	<u>Good A has a higher elasticity than good B.</u>

Some Properties of Elasticity

- Minus sign is implicit: e.g., a 10% *increase* in the price of oil *decreases* quantity demanded by 20%. Therefore, $E_D = -2$.
 - Unit-Free Measure: can compare elasticities among different goods. Is oil more price sensitive than butter?
 - Elasticity vs. Slope: these are not the same thing. Slope is $\Delta P / \Delta Q$.
 - Point Elasticity: $E_D = -\frac{fQ}{fP} \frac{P}{Q}$
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Estimated Price Elasticities

Type of Good or Service	Price Elasticity
Eggs	0.1
Petrol	0.2
Shoes	0.9
Foreign Travel	1.2
Alcoholic Beverages	1.5
Jewelry	2.6

Accounting for Differences



- Degree of Substitutability
- Temporary vs. Permanent Price Changes
- Long-run vs. Short-run elasticity

The Price Setter's Dilemma



- To increase price, the monopolist must restrict its supply.
 - To sell more output, the monopolist must lower its price.
 - Which action will increase its total revenue?
 - Price elasticity of demand gives the answer as it gives a relationship between percentage changes in
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Unit Elasticity, Total Revenue, and Expenditure

- If demand is unit elastic, an increase in price results in an equal percentage decrease in the quantity demanded and total revenue and total expenditure remain constant.
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Elastic Demand, Revenue and Expenditure

- If demand is elastic, a decrease in price results in a larger percentage increase in the quantity demanded and total revenue and total expenditure **increase** when **$E_d > 1$** .

P ↓ **Q** ↑ and **TR** ↑

Inelastic Demand, Revenue and Expenditure


- If demand is inelastic, an increase in price results in a smaller percentage decrease in the quantity demanded and total revenue and total expenditure increase.

P ↑ **Q** ↓ and **TR** ↑


Total Revenue Test



- The *total revenue test* is a method of estimating the price elasticity of demand by observing the change in total revenue that results from a price change (all other things remaining the same).
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(a) Demand



(b) Total revenue

Maximising Revenue



- A monopolist who wishes to maximise revenue will set price equal to \$500 and only sell 500 units.
 - But a monopolist is interested in maximising its payoff, that is, revenue minus costs or profit.
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Maximising Profit



- When should the monopolist supply an additional unit?
 - Whenever the additional revenue earned by supplying that unit exceeds the marginal cost of producing that unit.
 - In our example, whenever marginal revenue exceeds \$200.
 - By producing up to the point where marginal revenue equals marginal cost, the monopolist maximises
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Marginal Revenue

Price	\$1000	\$900	\$800	\$700	\$600	\$500	\$400	\$300	\$200
Revenue	\$0	\$90t	\$160t	\$210t	\$240t	\$250t	\$240t	\$210t	\$160t
Marginal Revenue		\$90t	\$70t	\$40t	\$30t	\$10t	-\$10t	-\$30t	-\$40t

Marginal revenue from \$100 price movements


Marginal cost of 100 unit movements equals \$20t

A Snapshot



Price	\$602	\$601	\$600	\$599	\$598
Revenue	\$239,596	\$239,799	\$240,000	\$240,199	\$240,396
Marginal Revenue	\$205	\$203	\$201	\$199	\$197
Profits	\$159,996	\$159,999	\$160,000	\$159,999	\$159,996

Graphically



Mathematically



■ Demand:

- Demand function: $Q_D = 1000 - P$

- Total Revenue = $P * Q = 1000Q - Q^2$

- Marginal Revenue = $\frac{dTR}{dQ} = 1000 - 2Q$

■ Costs:

- Total Cost function $C(Q) = \text{Fixed} + 200 * Q$

- Marginal Cost $\frac{dC(Q)}{dQ} = 200$

Marginal Condition



- Set Marginal Revenue equal to Marginal Cost:

$$1000 - 2Q = 200$$

or

$$Q = 400$$

- Find price by substituting this into the inverse demand function $P = 1000 - Q = \$600$.
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Monopoly Price and Elasticity

- How does monopoly price relate to elasticity?
 - Suppose market demand is $Q = D(P)$. The monopolist maximises $D(P)(P - c)$.
 - Differentiate profits with respect to P : $\frac{fQ}{fP}(P - c) + Q = 0$? $P = \frac{1}{1 - \frac{1}{E_D}} c$
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Elasticity as a Measure of Monopoly Power




- Recall that demand will be more elastic if close substitutes for a product exist.
 - Therefore, elasticity can be a measure of monopoly power.
 - In particular, economists look to cross elasticities of demand and supply to define markets.
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Social Losses



- By setting price equal to \$600, the monopolist earns \$160,000. Consumer surplus is \$80,000.
 - The cost of this is that those buyers with valuations between \$200 and \$600 do not purchase the good, even though WTP exceeds marginal cost.
 - The loss in potential value is \$80,000 or 25% of potential value. This is termed a 'deadweight loss.'
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Deadweight Triangle




Modified Example




- Suppose that the seller has two products that are similar. One is the 'deluxe' version and the other is a 'budget' version.
 - The budget version is missing some features that 20% of customers find essential. Their WTP for the budget version is zero. They also happen to be the consumers with the highest WTP for the product.
 - 80% have no use for the deluxe features and value the two products the same.
 - Both products cost the same to produce.
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Graphical Depiction



Graphical Depiction



Price Discrimination

- Having two products allows the monopolist to discriminate among customers. It charges different prices for the two products.
 - Budget product pricing:
 - $MR = 800 - 2Q = 200$ or $Q = 300$, $P_B = \$500$
 - Deluxe product pricing:
 - If price is below \$800 you are simply losing revenue without gaining customers.
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Enhanced Value



- Monopolist now sells 500 units.
 - Its revenue is \$310,000 and profit is \$210,000. A gain of \$50,000.
 - What happens to consumer surplus?
 - $\$20,000 + \$45,000 = \$65,000$
 - A reduction from the single product case
 - What happens to value created?
 - Deadweight loss of \$45,000
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Damaged Goods



- Some firms engage in 'crimping the product.' That is, they engage in costly adjustments to differentiate products.

Examples: Cannon printers

Student versions of software

- Previous example indicates value to the monopolist from doing this. This can also improve social welfare.
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Price Discrimination in General



- The example indicates that by charging different prices a monopolist can create more value.
 - To achieve this, the monopolist must be able to segment the market.
 - Otherwise arbitrage will be possible
 - Change product
 - Identify different customer types.
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Types of Price Discrimination



- First degree (perfect) price discrimination:
 - charge a different price for every consumer and every unit sold.
 - Second degree price discrimination
 - volume discounts, multi-part tariffs and non-linear prices
 - Third degree price discrimination
 - segment the market; charge a uniform price within each market segment
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First degree price discrimination

- Charge a different price for each unit purchased
 - Like bargaining over each unit individually.
 - Then monopolist has no incentive to exclude any buyer or unit and restrict supply. Maximum value creation.
 - Why might this be difficult?
 - Arbitrage
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Second degree price discrimination



- “Block” Electricity Pricing:
 - suppose there are large and small customers.
 - Charge a certain price up to X MWh
 - Then have a discount.
 - Small buyer demand unchanged
 - Larger buyers purchase more
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Two part tariff




- Telephone pricing
 - set marginal or per unit price at marginal cost
 - capture surplus through rental or continuing charges
 - Water pricing
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Third degree price discrimination



- Segment market
 - Charge higher price to market with relatively inelastic demand
 - This is what occurred in the product crimping story
 - Other examples ...
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Example 1: Railroads



- Railroads set different prices for coal and grain
 - coal traffic: relatively inelastic
 - grain traffic: elastic (intermodal competition)
 - Coal 2 or 3 times higher than grain
 - How are markets segmented?
 - Railroads know who buys coal (electricity generators). They do not buy wheat
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Example 2: Airline Tickets



Why is there a discount for a Saturday night stay?


- Way of segmenting market. Business travellers less likely to stay over weekend.
 - Different elasticities:
 - price elasticity (discount): -1.83
 - price elasticity (full economy): -1.3
 - Also make it hard to change discount
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Example 3: Stamps



- In Sri Lanka postage of a plain postcard cost 1 rupee (2 cents). Postage of a pictured postcard cost 14 rupees.
 - Exploit relatively inelastic demand of tourists.
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Example 4: Intertemporal effects



- Product life cycle discrimination
 - Early buyers often have much more inelastic demand
 - first run movies
 - computer software
 - computer hardware
 - CDs
 - new sports equipment
-

Application



Pricing and the Internet

Difficulties in Pricing Information



- Characteristics of information
 - High sunk costs of production
 - Low (or zero) marginal costs of replication
 - If no property rights, why produce information?
 - Example: CD phone directories
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Forms of Differential Pricing



- Personalised pricing
 - Sell to each user at a different price
 - Versioning
 - Offer a product line and let users choose
 - Group pricing
 - Based on group membership/identity
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Personalised Pricing



- Catalog inserts
 - Market research
 - Differentiation
- Easy on the Internet

Traditional Industries



- Airlines
 - Direct mail
 - Lexis/Nexis
 - Supermarket scanners
 - Profit margin more than doubled 1993-1996
 - More effective than other forms of advertising
-

Internet



- Virtual Vineyards
- Auctions
- Closeouts, promotions

Personalise Your Product



- Personalise product, personalise price
 - PointCast
 - Personalised ads
 - Hot words (in cents/view) bulk & target
 - Deja News: 2.0 4.0
 - Excite: 2.4 4.0
 - Infoseek: 1.3 5.0
 - Yahoo: 2.0 3.0
-

Versioning



Need to add value to the initial version of a product

- Delay
 - User Interface
 - Convenience
 - Image Resolution
 - Speed of Operation
 - Flexibility of Use
 - Capability
 - Features & Functions
 - Comprehensiveness
 - Annoyance
 - Support
-

Example



- 40 type As: \$100 for speed, \$40 for slow
 - 60 type Bs: \$50 for speed, \$30 for slow
 - Identity-based pricing: \$7000 revenues
 - Offer only speedy: \$50 is best price, revenues=\$5,000
 - Offer only slow: not as profitable
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Versioning Solution



- Try speedy for \$100, slow for \$30
 - Will this work? Compare benefits and costs
 - $100 - 100 = 0$, but $40 - 30 = 10 > 0$
 - Discount the fast version: $100 - p = 40 - 30$
 - So, $p = 90$
 - Revenues = \$5,400 = $90 \times 40 + 30 \times 60$
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Making Self-Selection Work



- May need to cut price of high end
 - May need to cut quality at low end
 - Value-subtracted versions
 - May cost more to produce the low-quality version.
 - In design, make sure you can turn features off!
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Pitfalls



- Resentment
 - Victoria's secret
- Arbitrage
 - Windows NT workstation/server

Online and Offline Versions



- The Whole Internet
 - Netscape Navigator
 - Dyson Dictum: think of content as free
 - Focus on adding value to online version
 - National Academy of Science Press
 - Format for browsing, not printing
-

Group Pricing



- Price sensitivity
- Network effects, standardisation
- Lock-In
- Sharing

Price Sensitivity



- International pricing
 - US edition textbook: \$70
 - Indian edition textbook: \$5
- Problems raised by Internet
 - Localization as solution

Network Effects



- Compatibility
 - Site licenses
 - Variety of schemes: per client, per user, per server, etc.
 - Lock-In
 - *Wall Street Journal's* Newspapers-in-education
 - Microsoft Office
 - Per seat, concurrent
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Sharing



- Transactions cost of sharing
- Videos
- Desire for repeat play

Electric Library



- Who to sell to?
- Households
- Schools/libraries