or

Beyond the Bottom Line! Robert Marks

Week

1. Introduction; Financial Appraisal v. Cost-Benefit Analysis

or

Beyond the Bottom Line! Robert Marks

- 1. Introduction; Financial Appraisal v. Cost-Benefit Analysis
- 2. Basics of Project Evaluation

or

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- 1. Introduction; Financial Appraisal v. Cost-Benefit Analysis
- 2. Basics of Project Evaluation
- 3. Shadow Pricing;

or

Beyond the Bottom Line! Robert Marks

- 1. Introduction; Financial Appraisal v. Cost-Benefit Analysis
- 2. Basics of Project Evaluation
- 3. Shadow Pricing; Effects of Price Changes & Welfare Economics

or

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- 1. Introduction; Financial Appraisal v. Cost-Benefit Analysis
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- 3. Shadow Pricing; Effects of Price Changes & Welfare Economics
- 4. Indirect Price Change Effects

or

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- 1. Introduction; Financial Appraisal v. Cost-Benefit Analysis
- 2. Basics of Project Evaluation
- 3. Shadow Pricing; Effects of Price Changes & Welfare Economics
- 4. Indirect Price Change Effects
- 5. Valuing the Environment & Other Unmarketed Goods

or

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- 6. **Risk-Benefit Analysis**

or

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- 6. Risk-Benefit Analysis
- 7. Multi-Attribute Decision Analysis

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Package

or

Beyond the Bottom Line!

Robert Marks

Week

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- 2. Basics of Project Evaluation
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- 6. Risk-Benefit Analysis
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Package Assessment

or

Beyond the Bottom Line!

Robert Marks

Week

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Package Assessment Prerequisites



- Talk
- Use of PDF slides/ OHP slides

- Talk
- Use of PDF slides/ OHP slides
- Use of whyteboard

- Talk
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- Use of whyteboard
- Interaction, discussion, rôle-playing exercise, assignments, mid-term exam, term project.

Topics introduced through lectures:

- Talk
- Use of PDF slides/ OHP slides
- Use of whyteboard

Interaction, discussion, rôle-playing exercise, assignments, mid-term exam, term project. No tutes, but worked exercises are available.

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EIA is not for everyone — doesn't *directly* help the firm's bottom line. Cost-benefit analysis.

Topics introduced through lectures:

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No class on Monday November 27; makeup TBA.

This Week: We Cover ...

1.

This Week: We Cover ...

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    Intro — decision-making issues.
    2.
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- 1. Intro decision-making issues.
- 2. Economic efficiency, or the size of the economic pie.
- 3.

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- 4. Comparing Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) with Financial Appraisal (FA).
- 5.

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- 4. Comparing Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) with Financial Appraisal (FA).
- 5. The use of *opportunity cost*, not accounting cost, in CBA.

1. Introduction Five Principles (See Landsburg in the Package.) 1.

1. Introduction

Five Principles (See Landsburg in the Package.)

 Tax revenues are not a net benefit, and a reduction in tax revenues is not a net cost. Tax is a *transfer* = something for nothing. (So long as the Referent group is all society.)

2.

Page 4

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Page 4

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- **5**.

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Only Individuals Matter

Page 4

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Only Individuals Matter

All Individuals Matter Equally: (a \$ is a \$) (We'll return to these during the term.)

Making Decisions

Making Decisions

The Analyst/Decision Maker can:

- **1.** set priorities \rightarrow weightings
- 2. generate a set of alternatives
- 3. choose "best" alternative
- 4. but *how*?
- 5. need a performance measurement.

Is this a tall order?

e.g. choosing chemical-processing equipment e.g. choosing a word-processing system

Is this a tall order?

e.g. choosing chemical-processing equipment e.g. choosing a word-processing system — \$ cost

e.g. choosing chemical-processing equipment e.g. choosing a word-processing system

- \$ cost
- performance

e.g. choosing chemical-processing equipment

- e.g. choosing a word-processing system
 - \$ cost
 - performance
 - servicing

e.g. choosing chemical-processing equipment

e.g. choosing a word-processing system

- \$ cost
- performance
- servicing
- training

< >

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- \$ cost
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- training
- documentation

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(emergence of standards e.g. MS Word)

?

2. How Can We Compare:

- the pluses & minuses ?
- the advantages & disadvantages ?
- the benefits & costs ?

?

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- the pluses & minuses ?
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The finance boys & girls: "The \$ bottom line!"

?

2. How Can We Compare:

- the pluses & minuses ?
- the advantages & disadvantages ?
- the benefits & costs ?

The finance boys & girls: "The \$ bottom line!" but is that sufficient? (it's necessary—why?)

But what if:

- market prices ≠ social values?

But what if:

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- the project would alter prices?

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Then use techniques of Cost-Benefit Analysis (Examples)

 \rightarrow Prescriptive "ought"

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→ Prescriptive "ought"

not

But what if:

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- there exist unpriced externalities (spillovers)?

Then use techniques of Cost-Benefit Analysis (Examples)

→ Prescriptive "ought" not Descriptive "is"

Let us distinguish first:

Let us distinguish first:

"what is" – descriptive from

Let us distinguish first:

- "what is" descriptive from
- "what ought to be" prescriptive
- Financial objectives the bottom line
 2.

- **1.** Financial objectives the bottom line
- 2. Broader objectives of Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) or: *Beyond the bottom line!*

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 - when the organisation provides non-sold services e.g. defence forces
 - when there are external costs/benefits
 - when prices change because the project is sufficiently large
 - if social discount rate ≠ private discount rate

Cost-Benefit Analysis:

CBA:

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CBA: all the effects of a project on society,

Cost-Benefit Analysis:

CBA: all the effects of a project on society, not just the direct (usually financial) effects.
Q: objective, measurement ?
A: welfare of each individual, ideally CBA:

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Cost-Benefit Analysis:

- CBA: all the effects of a project on society, not just the direct (usually financial) effects.Q: objective, measurement ?
 - A: welfare of each individual, ideally
 - CBA: "market" mimicked where it doesn't exist, or is only imperfect in its information
 - → a common unit to measure aggregate costs & benefits: shadow prices.

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Shadow Prices



market prices ≠ necessarily shadow prices (*social* benefits & costs at the margin)

how

to identify measure compare

changes in people's welfare ?

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Page 11

Shadow Prices



market prices ≠ necessarily shadow prices (*social* benefits & costs at the margin)

howto identify
measure
compare→the ParetoPrinciple

changes in people's welfare ?

3. Potential Pareto Improvement Criterion (PPIC) [see C&B Ch. 1, FP Ch. 1.5, 4.1; S&W, Ch. 7]

a *Pareto Improvement* = a change that makes at least one person better off & no-one worse off (a measure of increasing economic efficiency, or reducing waste) 3. Potential Pareto Improvement Criterion (PPIC) [see C&B Ch. 1, FP Ch. 1.5, 4.1; S&W, Ch. 7]

a *Pareto Improvement* = a change that makes at least one person better off & no-one worse off (a measure of increasing economic efficiency, or reducing waste)

a project is OK under PPIC (or the Kaldor-Hicks criterion) if *in principle* it is possible to secure an actual Pareto improvement by linking the project to a set of money transfers between the "gainers" and the "losers", in such a way that in principle noone is worse off, even if these transfers don't actually take place, i.e., a *potential* improvement. 3. Potential Pareto Improvement Criterion (PPIC) [see C&B Ch. 1, FP Ch. 1.5, 4.1; S&W, Ch. 7]

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e.g. the noise cost of airport expansion.

Example: The noise cost of airport expansion.

Questions:

Iosers:

Questions:

 losers: minimum amount (\$) you'd accept to put up with the project?

Questions:

- losers: minimum amount (\$) you'd accept to put up with the project? (Willingness to accept, WTA.) (or: your willingness to pay WTP to stop the project)
- gainers:

Questions:

 losers: minimum amount (\$) you'd accept to put up with the project? (Willingness to accept, WTA.) (or: your willingness to pay WTP to stop the project)

gainers: maximum amount (\$) you'd pay for the project

Questions:

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Questions:

 losers: minimum amount (\$) you'd accept to put up with the project? (Willingness to accept, WTA.) (or: your willingness to pay WTP to stop the project)

 gainers: maximum amount (\$) you'd pay for the project (Willingness to pay, WTP.)

Then: If Σ gainers \$ > Σ losers \$

then the PPIC is satisfied.

1.

1. that every taste can be valued in money (everyone has their price) ("pricing out")

2.

- 1. that every taste can be valued in money (everyone has their price) ("pricing out")
- 2. that changes in people's welfare (measured by their Consumer Surplus) can be measured by their "willingness to pay" (their preferences)
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- 1. that every taste can be valued in money (everyone has their price) ("pricing out")
- 2. that changes in people's welfare (measured by their Consumer Surplus) can be measured by their "willingness to pay" (their preferences)
- 3. that these individual preferences are to be weighted by the individual's *ability to pay* ("a dollar is a dollar")

- 1. that every taste can be valued in money (everyone has their price) ("pricing out")
- 2. that changes in people's welfare (measured by their Consumer Surplus) can be measured by their "willingness to pay" (their preferences)
- 3. that these individual preferences are to be weighted by the individual's *ability to pay* ("a dollar is a dollar")
- 4. truthfulness (although perhaps there are techniques to reward truthfulness) this is an operational problem, not a conceptual barrier.



Two alternatives suggested by S&W:

1.

< >



Two alternatives suggested by S&W:

- 1. decision-making approach (DMA)
- 2.



- Two alternatives suggested by S&W:
- 1. decision-making approach (DMA)
- 2. Paretian approach (PA)
- 1. DMA:

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- Two alternatives suggested by S&W:
- 1. decision-making approach (DMA)
- 2. Paretian approach (PA)

1. DMA: The decision maker's objectives are the social objectives, by definition

CBA: process of appraising projects, given the DM's chosen objectives may be private

2. PA:

2. PA: objectives of the decision maker *should* be distilled from a consensus of the value judgements of the individuals in society

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 - independent of political process

- 2. PA: objectives of the decision maker should be distilled from a consensus of the value judgements of the individuals in society
 - independent of political process
 - a "consensus value-judgement", which can be identified using welfare economics i.e. using Consumers' Surplus (revision)

- 1. DMA: "PPIC (i.e. efficiency) is one objective of DM"
- 2.

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 → economic efficiency: size of the cake
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- 1. DMA: "PPIC (i.e. efficiency) is one objective of DM"
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- 1. DMA: "PPIC (i.e. efficiency) is one objective of DM"
- 2. PA: (anyone has a veto in the Pareto Optimal sense, e.g. the king) **Welfare Economics** \rightarrow economic efficiency: size of the cake V. distributional justice: relative size of the slices **PPIC:** a change is "good" if \rightarrow greater economic efficiency (i.e. a larger cake) winners v. losers [C&B Ch. 5, DoF Ch.2] PA: "economic rationalism"

Week 1	A G S M © 2006	Page 18
Efficiency v. Equity	more equal	
Less efficiency, greater equality.	Greater efficienc greater equality.	у,
	• A	
Smaller cake, more even slices.	Larger cake, more even slices.	
	• <i>B</i>	
	Status Quo Ante	efficiency
Less efficiency, less equality.	Greater efficienc less equality.	у,
Smaller cake, less even slices.	Larger cake, less even slices.	
less equal • C Efficiency v. Equity or Fairness (lexicographic ordering)		

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Two questions:





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Page 19

Two questions:

Can an unbiased decision maker exist?
 2.

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Page 19

Two questions:

- 1. Can an unbiased decision maker exist?
- 2. How should the decision maker choose between:

economic growth

?

environmental protection

assuming there is a conflict?

e.g.

e.g. A large project requires the purchase and use of 1000 t of bricks

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FA: know market prices (bricks cheapest)

e.g. A large project requires the purchase and use of 1000 t of bricks

FA: know market prices (bricks cheapest) CBA: welfare of owners of brickworks employees of brickworks other users of bricks etc.

So far, so good ...

Competitive markets \rightarrow no problems

but if (IF) there is a competitive market economy, (with no externalities)

brick price = MC of brick production = MV to users wage = MV of leisure = MV of labour to workers to brickworks & so long as no prices change, *then*

Competitive markets \rightarrow no problems

but if (IF) there is a competitive market economy, (with no externalities)

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Competitive markets \rightarrow no problems

but if (IF) there is a competitive market economy, (with no externalities)

brick price = MC of brick production = MV to users = MV of leisure = MV of labour wage to brickworks to workers & so long as no prices change, then there are no welfare effects & prices = marginal social benefits = marginal social costs and FA = CBA(so long as there is no price change)

But

•

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But

perfect competition is rare

But

- perfect competition is rare
- prices may adjust to project (because of its size)
- •

But

- perfect competition is rare
- prices may adjust to project (because of its size)
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 \bullet

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- taxes exist

But

- perfect competition is rare
- prices may adjust to project (because of its size)
- externalities may exist (spillovers, +ve or -ve)
- taxes exist
- \therefore FA \neq CBA necessarily

Economic analysis		Financial analysis	
CBA		FA	
Viewpoint	Society as a whole	Individual, firm, or household.	

	Economic analysis CBA	Financial analysis FA	
Viewpoint	Society as a whole	Individual, firm, or household.	
Objective	Increase in welfare	Increase in individual, firm, or household profit or income.	

	Economic analysis CBA	Financial analysis FA
Viewpoint	Society as a whole	Individual, firm, or household.
Objective	Increase in welfare	Increase in individual, firm, or household profit or income.
Benefit	Any kind of satisfaction or increase in welfare, including monetary revenue.	Monetary revenue.

	Economic analysis CBA	Financial analysis FA
Viewpoint	Society as a whole	Individual, firm, or household.
Objective	Increase in welfare	Increase in individual, firm, or household profit or income.
Benefit	Any kind of satisfaction or increase in welfare, including monetary revenue.	Monetary revenue.
Benefit measurement	Willingness to pay or accept compensation	Monetary revenue.

	Economic analysis CBA	Financial analysis FA
Viewpoint	Society as a whole	Individual, firm, or household.
Objective	Increase in welfare	Increase in individual, firm, or household profit or income.
Benefit	Any kind of satisfaction or increase in welfare, including monetary revenue.	Monetary revenue.
Benefit measurement	Willingness to pay or accept compensation	Monetary revenue.
Cost	Any kind of dissatisfaction or fall in welfare, including monetary cost.	Monetary cost.

	Economic analysis CBA	Financial analysis FA
Viewpoint	Society as a whole	Individual, firm, or household.
Objective	Increase in welfare	Increase in individual, firm, or household profit or income.
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Cost measurement	Opportunity cost.	Monetary cost.

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Cost	Any kind of dissatisfaction or fall in welfare, including monetary cost.	Monetary cost.	
Cost measurement	Opportunity cost.	Monetary cost.	
Value	Net change in welfare.	Net change in monetary revenue.	

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Viewpoint	Society as a whole	Individual, firm, or household.	
Objective	Increase in welfare	Increase in individual, firm, or household profit or income.	
Benefit	Any kind of satisfaction or increase in welfare, including monetary revenue.		
Benefit measurement	Willingness to pay or accept compensation	Monetary revenue.	
Cost	Any kind of dissatisfaction or fall in welfare, including monetary cost.	Monetary cost.	
Cost measurement	Opportunity cost.	Monetary cost.	
Value	Net change in welfare.	Net change in monetary revenue.	
Measure	dollars	dollars	

Source: *Techniques to Value Environmental Resources: An Introductory Handbook*, Canberra: AGPS, 1995.

Question:

Page 24

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Bill asserts that he could not even "give away" (for literally zero dollars) a building that he owns and uses in his business.

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In economic jargon, the building has a zero opportunity cost. True/False?

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Bill asserts that he could not even "give away" (for literally zero dollars) a building that he owns and uses in his business.

In economic jargon, the building has a zero opportunity cost. True/False? Explain.

(Write down your answer.)

5. Use Opportunity Costs, not Accounting Costs: Example [S&W, pp.35–36]: Service A or B? A private bus company: 1.

5. Use *Opportunity Costs*, not Accounting Costs:

Example [S&W, pp.35–36]: Service A or B?

- A private bus company:
 - 1. Running Costs

Suppose the differences in running costs *C* reported by different bus fleets can be explained quite well by the equation (in \$'000):

C= 250.0 +1.5b+ 0.0038h+ 0.00006kper yearbuseshourskilometres

5. Use *Opportunity Costs*, not Accounting Costs:

Example [S&W, pp.35–36]: Service A or B?

A private bus company:

1. Running Costs

Suppose the differences in running costs *C* reported by different bus fleets can be explained quite well by the equation (in \$'000):

C= 250.0 + 1.5b+ 0.0038h+ 0.00006kper yearbuseshourskilometres

- **b** = 300 buses (typical fleet)
- *k* = 48,000 km/year/bus (both services)
- *h* = 3,000 hr/year/bus (typical)

ightarrow *C* = \$4,984,000/y excluding costs of buying \$4,984,000/year

2.

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2. Capital Costs \$24,000/bus for 15 years (lifetime) → \$2,804/year/bus @ 8% p.a. (accounting depreciation) 300 buses → \$841,000/year \$841,000/year

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 \rightarrow \$0.40/bus-kilometre (accounting cost). \$0.40/bus-km

Table 3.1: Characteristics of the two bus services

	Bus-km per week	Hours of service per week	Average speed (km per hour)	Additional buses required
Service A	4,000	20	12.5	16
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Table 3.2: Accounting and opportunity costs of the two bus services

	Cost inc 0	curred in year(s) 1–15	Present cost in year 0
\$0.40/bus-km	\rightarrow Accou	Inting costs	\$ thousands
Service A	_	83.2 per year	712.2
Service B	-	83.2 per year	712.2
Opportunity	<i>costs</i> (usi	ng equation)	
Service A	384.0	92.9 per year	1,179.5
Service B	48.0	47.1 per year	451.1

All costs in \$'000. Present value calculated by using a discount rate of 8% p.a.

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So: Using the accounting cost of \$0.40/bus-kilometre understates the opportunity cost of Service A and overstates the cost of Service B.

Why CBA? [C&B Ch. 1, DoF 2.6]

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• Marginal-cost pricing implies that costs and benefits are valued at their *opportunity costs*.

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- Inputs are valued on the basis of the maximum that others would have paid for them (except when there are no other users, in which case they are valued on the basis of the relevant constituent costs). (Later.)

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- CBA encourages clear thinking about the true "value added" from a proposal.
- CBA adds a useful "hard edge" to an evaluation strategy.

When To Use CBA?

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- Undertaking a new or replacement capital project.
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- Using or disposing of an existing asset.
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- To value or not?

Week 1

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- 3. The efficiency criterion: The Potential Pareto Improvement Criterion (PPIC), in which the overall size of the pie is the issue, not the sizes of the slices — redistribution is seen as a political responsibility.

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- 4. Comparing CBA with Financial Appraisal.
- 5. The use of *opportunity cost*, not accounting cost, as a general rule.